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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Timpson argued that the district court erred when it
summarily dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. This reply brief is necessary to
address the State’s response in which it argues that holding that Mr. Timpson verified the claims
in his reply to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss would require this Court to make
factual findings. Additionally, it is necessary to respond to the State’s argument that the district
court did not err by applying the wrong standards in reaching its decision, and the State’s
“alternative argument” that the district court should have dismissed Mr. Timpson’s claim
because Mr. Timpson did not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue an Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Timpson’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Timpson’s post-conviction petition?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Timpson’s Post-Conviction Petition
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Timpson argued that, because the defect in his reply to the
district court’s notice of intent to dismiss was a one of form only, as it was a clerical error, the
district court erred when it held that reply was not properly verified. (App. Br., pp.8-9.) In
response, the State argues that “[t]his theory finds no support in the record . . . because Timpson
never made this claim to the district court. Timpson did not present an affidavit.” (Resp.
Br., p.6.) Thus, according to the State, finding that the reply was properly verified would require
this Court to make factual findings. (Resp. Br., p.4.)
The State never objected to Mr. Timpson’s reply on this or any other basis. And the
facts do not need to be further developed in order for this Court to find that this was a defect in
form that did not prejudice the State. The record is clear that the certificate of verification
attached to the reply contained the following language:

“I, BRANDON TIMPSON, the

petitioner named in the above-entitled action, first being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and
say that I have read the foregoing amended petition and the documents, affidavits, and exhibits
attached to this amended petition are hereby sworn to be true and correct to the best of my
information, knowledge, and belief.” (R., p.83.)
This is the exact language used in the certificate of verification attached to
Mr. Timpson’s amended petition, which was filed approximately one month earlier.
R., p.65.)

(See

However, as explained in the Appellant’s Brief, the dates on those certificates,

including the notarization date, were different. (App. Br., p.8.) Therefore, it is clear that the
inclusion of the words “amended petition” was a mistake; there is no other logical reason why
this would occur. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the reply was not properly
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verified. 1

Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385

(Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). Therefore, this Court can determine whether the district
court’s conclusion was wrong based on the record as it stands, and it does not need to engage in
fact-finding. Indeed, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief, this situation is similar to that in State v.
Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768 (2016), where the Court determined—after examining the
circumstances of the case—that the fact that the charging document was entitled “true bill” rather
than “information” was “best categorized as a defect in form.” (App. Br., pp.8-9.)
Further support for such an approach is found in State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 307
(2010), where the Idaho Supreme Court held that, despite the fact that the date of the filing
“stamp was marked May 7, 2005, other circumstances clearly demonstrate[d] that the document
was actually filed on June 7, 2005, including the June 7, 2005 date of the sentencing hearing, the
June 7, 2005 signature of the district court judge, a handwritten memorandum entry in the district
court file reflecting entry of judgment on June 7, 2005 . . . .” Therefore, other aspects of the
record allowed the Court to determine that “the May 7, 2005 date [was] simply the result of
clerical error” without impermissibly fact-finding. Id. Similarly, in this case, the dates on the
certificate of verification attached to Mr. Timpson’s reply to the district court’s notice of intent to
dismiss demonstrate that the use of the words “amended petition” instead of “reply” was a
clerical error only, and that Mr. Timpson verified his statements in the reply as true.
In response to Mr. Timpson’s argument that the district court applied incorrect standards
when it held that Mr. Timpson’s Rule 35 motion would not have been granted, the State points
out that the district court stated “the motion would have been futile” because the new
information contained in the reply did not render Mr. Timpson’s sentence excessive. (Resp.
1

The district court did not explain why it reached this conclusion, but this is the only readily
evident issue with the certificate of verification attached to Mr. Timpson’s reply. (R., p.98.)
4

Br., p.6.) However, the State ignores Mr. Timpson’s argument that the district court arrived at
this conclusion based in part on its finding that the new information Mr. Timpson presented did
not “erase the crimes he committed.” (App. Br., p.10.) Instead, it argues only that the district
court applied the correct standard. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) Even if a district court can summarily
dismiss a post-conviction claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a
motion based on its finding that the motion would not have been granted, it cannot do so by
relying on criteria that are impossible to meet. Indeed, if defendants were required to prove that
the new information submitted in support of Rule 35 motions “erased” their crimes, then no Rule
35 motion requesting leniency would ever be granted.
Finally, as an “alternative argument,” the State argues that the district court should have
dismissed Mr. Timpson’s claim “on the purely legal ground that Timpson did not have a
constitutional right to counsel to pursue a motion for reconsideration.” (Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) The
State did not make this argument in the district court. (R., pp.43, 53-54.) Instead, it argued only
that Mr. Timpson failed to “identify any new or additional information that his attorney should
have provided to the district court in support of the motion that would have created a reasonable
likelihood the court would have reduced his sentence.” (R., p.54 (emphasis in original).) As
such, the State’s alternative argument is not properly before this Court on appeal. See State v.
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-76 (2017) (holding that issues not argued before the trial
court will not be considered on appeal, and that this “applies equally to all parties on appeal”).
Further, if this Court were to consider the State’s alternative argument and affirm on this
basis, it would violate Mr. Timpson’s right to notice and an opportunity to respond because
neither the State’s motion for summary disposition, nor the district court’s notice of intent to
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dismiss, included any such rationale. (R., pp.67-79.) See DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602
(2009); I.C. § 19-4906(b).
Additionally, even if the State’s alternative argument was not procedurally barred, its
argument that there is “no reason to believe” a Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in Idaho
is contrary to Idaho precedent. (Resp. Br., p.9.) Indeed, one of the cases the State relies on for
this proposition states, “A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages of the
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.” State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 523
(Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). And in Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,
924 (Ct. App. 1992), the court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “based upon
counsel's alleged failure to file a Rule 35 motion, properly may be brought under the postconviction procedure act.” It went on to state that this holding was “further supported by the fact
that counsel is provided to a criminal defendant at the Rule 35 stage of proceedings, and that
there should be a remedy under Idaho's post-conviction procedure act for asserted ineffectiveness
of counsel at that stage.” Id. at 924-25. Notably, it wrote that it was following “the lead of the
Eighth Circuit in Voytik v. United States . . . .” Id. at 924. In Voytik, the court stated that
Mr. Voytik “alleged violation of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in
preparation of a motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35.” 778 F.2d 1306, 1310 (8th Cir. 1985).
Applying the Strickland standard, the court ultimately held that Mr. Voytik was not prejudiced
by his attorney’s failure to file a Rule 35 motion. Id. However, in following Voytik, the Idaho
Court of Appeals implicitly held that there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when pursuing
a Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Timpson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s judgment
dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the
claim that Mr. Timpson’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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